The tidal zone is high (13 to 26 feet [4 to 8 meters]) along the flatter west coast of the Korean Peninsula, with a maximum spring tide of nearly 8.2 meters. Along the Chinese coast, it is about 3 to 10 feet (0.9 to 3 meters), except around the Bo Hai, where it is slightly higher. In the Yellow Sea, tides are semidiural (i.e. they increase twice a day). The tidal system rotates counterclockwise. The tidal current speed is generally less than 1.6 km per hour in the middle of the sea, but stronger currents of more than 5.6 km per hour are recorded near coasts and straits and canals. China`s EEZ law and continental law provide that, if there are conflicting claims between China and states with opposing or adjacent coasts, they will be “settled on the basis of international law and in accordance with the principle of justice by an agreement delimiting the claimed territories.” [15] On the other hand, South Korea`s EEZ and continental shelf law simply states that the delimitation of the EEZ with opposing or neighbouring states must be done “in accordance with the States concerned on the basis of international law”. [16] However, the law also provides that south Korea`s EEZ rights “cannot be exercised in the maritime zone beyond the median border between the Republic of Korea and neighbouring states,” “unless otherwise agreed with the state concerned.” The middle line is defined as “the line whose point is equal to the next point on the Republic of Korea baseline and at the nearest point on the baseline of the state concerned.” [17] From a distance, the regions bordering the Yellow Sea are a matrix of separate countries, including China, Korea and Japan – countries that have long clashed, fought and interested each other and with powers alien to the hegemony of the Yellow Sea. On the other hand, which has only been made possible by the tectonic changes of the past two decades, a new understanding of the exceptional changes taking place in the current Yellow Sea Economic Basin (YSEB) is gaining a new understanding of the exceptional changes taking place in the current Yellow Sea Economic Basin (YSEB); an area within 300 miles of the Yellow Sea that includes China`s Bohai region, the Korean Peninsula and Kyushu, Japan. Several factors explain the clear lack of progress made in previous bilateral efforts to delineate a maritime border between China and South Korea. First, and perhaps most importantly, the essential element of any successful border negotiation, that is, the political will of both sides, seems uncertain. It seems that neither government saw the issue as an issue in need of an urgent solution, which means that it has not had the political impetus necessary for the compromises necessary to reach an agreement on maritime borders. Second, the two sides have taken radically different and opposing views as the basis for their respective maritime claims in the Yellow Sea, leading to fundamentally incompatible approaches to the delimitation of maritime borders.

Third, both states have claimed dubious baselines along their coasts. In addition, a submerged rock, known in Chinese Suyan Jiao, in Korean or Socotra Rock in English as Suyan Jiao, is a subsidiary but potentially aggravating problem. On the South Korean side, there is a desire to resolve maritime border issues in the Yellow Sea. This is due not only to the fact that the current rules clearly do not work, but also to the fact that it would be desirable to delineate the maritime border as quickly as possible. A delimitation would clarify jurisdictional rights and thus help to avoid potential conflicts by demarcating a line. It must be considered that the Chinese side also wants a solution to its dispute with the ROK. This would have the merit of trying to find negotiated neighbourhood solutions and thus restore confidence in China as a negotiating partner in other maritime disputes.

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